We empirically explore the influence of loan characteristics, banking and financial structure, and regulatory and institutional factors on the design of 10,930 bank loan syndicates in emerging market economies from 1990 to 2006. Our results show that the structure of syndicates is adapted to enhance monitoring of the borrower and to increase the efficiency of re-contracting process in case of borrower's distress. Main syndication motives, such as loans portfolio diversification, regulatory pressure and management costs reduction, influence syndicate design in emerging markets economies. JEL Codes : G21, C25.
Introduction
What are the determinants of bank loan syndicates' design (measured in terms of number of lenders and of arrangers) in emerging markets economies (EME)? The syndicate design might be different in EME and can therefore have important implications for the functioning and the development of syndicated loan markets, and more broadly for the financial and economic development of EME. As these economies are more fragile, a better knowledge of the determinants of bank loan syndicates provides timely policy recommendations on how to encourage the development of syndicated lending in these markets. This article is the first empirical research investigating the design of bank loan syndicates using loan and country level variables for 10,930 loan facilities to borrowers from emerging markets over the 1990-2006 period. Already in 1991, syndicated loans represented 67% of all emerging market corporate and sovereign borrowers' financing, twice the amount of total bond and equity financing (Altunbas et al., 2006) . Furthermore, in the last decade the volume of syndicated loans in emerging markets has considerably grown from 91.8 billion USD in 1995 to 379.8 billion USD in 2005 1 . During that period, the number of issues increased from 791 in 1995 to 1124 in 2005. Currently, syndicated loans represent an important source of external finance in emerging markets, comparable to bond markets and often larger than equity markets (Nini, 2004) . In 2005, syndicated lending corresponds to more than 11% of the private credit of financial institutions in Singapore, almost 23% in
Mexico and close to 36% in the Russian Federation 2 . However, following the Asian crisis -5 -A syndicated loan has several advantages that motivate the lenders. It allows to diversify loan portfolios and thus to avoid excessive single-name exposure in compliance with the regulatory limits while maintaining a relationship with the borrower, it helps to exploit comparative advantages of syndicate members in terms of financing and eventually in terms of information sharing and it allows also diversifying income sources through the collection of fees. While these advantages mostly apply to senior syndicate members, lack of origination capability and cutting down origination costs are main advantages for junior participants. These can also benefit from the know-how transfer between members (Tykvova, 2007) 5 .
Loan syndication has also several drawbacks as it generates potential agency problems due to informational frictions between the senior and the junior members of the syndicate. Following Diamond (1984) , Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) and Gorton and Pennachi (1995) , borrower monitoring by multiple creditors may lead to cost inefficiency and free-riding. Hence, creditors usually delegate monitoring to one financial intermediary, the arranger, who acts as the syndication agent. As his monitoring effort is unobservable, the syndicate faces a moral hazard problem. Additionally, the arranger collects private information through due diligence or through a previous lending relationship. If this information cannot be credibly communicated to the participants, an adverse selection problem arises as the arranger may syndicate loans with the less favorable information. Finally, handling borrower's financial distress is more 5 Borrowers can also gain advantages from syndication (Allen, 1990; Altunbas et al., 2006) : ability to arrange cross border transactions, restriction of negotiation with one bank, uniform terms and conditions, more competitive pricing resulting in lower spreads, lower fees compared to bond issues, more flexible funding structure, larger amount compared to public finance, and speed and discretion of arranging the deal.
complicated in a syndicate setting because lenders must reach a collective decision. The outcome of negotiations in debt restructurings are affected by the number of creditors, by the allocation of security among the set of creditors, and by the character of stringency of the voting rules among the creditors (Bolton and Scharfstein, 1996) .
The advantages of syndicated loans for banks and borrowers show that they provide an important financing vehicle for emerging markets and thus for their economic development as they contribute to enhance the sources of external finance in these countries. Moreover, if syndicated loans reduce the cost of borrowed funds, they also contribute to favor the financing of companies. The expansion of syndicated loans increases the diversification possibilities for banks in terms of risk and income, which decreases the likelihood of bank failures. As a consequence, the expansion of syndicated loans contributes to financial stability, which is a fundamental issue for emerging economies.
While these benefits are especially important for emerging markets finance, the agency problems related to syndications can have severe consequences for the financial stability of these markets. A crucial input to mitigate these problems is the structure of the syndicates that, if adapted, can reduce agency costs related to the syndication process.
Therefore, empirical investigation of the factors that influence the size and the composition of syndicates in emerging markets is an important and timely issue.
Academic literature investigating the structure of bank syndicates remains relatively scarce. The first empirical research on syndicate size and composition was performed by Lee and Mullineux (2004) , showing that syndicates on the US market are structured to enhance monitoring efforts and to facilitate renegotiation. Jones et al. (2005) -7 -and Sufi (2007) show that the lead bank retains larger share of the loan and forms a more concentrated syndicate when the borrower requires more intense monitoring and due diligence. Finally, François and Missonier-Piera (2007) empirically explore the motives for delegating administrative tasks (e.g.: issuing the legal documents, or holding the collateral) to specialized co-agents.
Contrary to the US syndication market, evidence regarding the structure of syndicates is very scarce for emerging market economies. The investigated issues are rather the determinants of syndicated loan pricing in developing countries (Altunbas et al., 2006) and the participation of local banks in syndications (Nini, 2004) . Therefore, the first objective of this work is to test if the same factors as in industrialized markets (along the lines of Lee and Mullineux, 2004) influence syndicates in emerging economies.
Furthermore, as the loan contract characteristics are definitely richer we also investigate the impact of such features as covenants, guarantors and sponsors on the syndicate structure. Finally, we also investigate the impact of banking and financial structure, regulatory environment and legal risk on the syndicate design.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the tested determinants of the syndicate structure. Section 3 presents data, methodology and variables, and section 4 displays the results. We conclude and provide further research perspectives in section 5.
Determinants of bank syndicate design

Syndicate design and agency problems
This paper investigates the factors that influence syndicate design and analyzes if that design is a response to the specific potential agency problems generated by bank loan syndication. Syndicate design is measured with total syndicate size (Number of Lenders) and with the number of senior syndicate members (Number of Arrangers). We make this distinction because senior members of the syndicate have different concerns and motivations compared to other participants. Therefore, the influence of the same factors can differ in terms of sign and significance depending on the status of the lender in the hierarchy of the syndicate 6 .
As mentioned in the introduction, syndicated loans present certain benefits and costs which influence their use. Namely, banks may expect benefits from syndicated loans through the diversification of loan portfolios and of sources of income with fee income obtained, the enforcement of the lending limits, and the possibility for some banks suffering from a lack of origination capacities in certain types of transactions to participate to certain types of loans.
However, syndicated loans generate two specific agency problems. First, private information about the borrower creates an adverse selection problem, as the arranger may be inclined to syndicate loans from bad borrowers 7 . Second, the participant banks delegate monitoring tasks to the arranger whose efforts are unobservable for participant banks, which results in a moral hazard problem 8 .
The structure of a syndicate can be viewed as an organizational response to these problems (Pichler and Wilhelm, 2001) . The arranger has concerns about the monitoring efforts of participants and can consequently influence the size and the composition of the syndicate which involve explicit and implicit costs / revenues tradeoff. It decides on the institutions it will invite to participate, chooses the initial menu of designated amounts for participation, the dollar size of each bracket, and the associated fees for each bracket. It also reserves the right to close the syndication at any time prior to the designated end of the offering period.
In order to provide a credible signal about the borrower's quality and to align monitoring incentives, the arranger can adjust its own portion of the loan (Jones et al., 2005; Sufi, 2007) . This can be achieved by forming a smaller syndicate and/or a smaller syndicate "core" with few arrangers. Smaller syndicates allow arrangers to minimize the management costs of a group lending process, to prevent free-riding, and to resolve borrower's financial distress problems more efficiently. However, large syndicates might allow exploiting scale economies. Seeking to develop or maintain reputation through reciprocity and repeat dealing is also a potential argument to form larger syndicates.
Enhancing fee income could also be achieved by forming a larger syndicate with small proportional holdings for each member.
In summary, the factors that influence the syndicate structure are expected to be those that banks, and especially the arranger, believe will modify the benefits and costs of syndication. These factors are loan characteristics but they can also be country-level variables taking banking regulation, financial development and institutional framework into account.
Loan characteristics
We first test the role of several loan characteristics that might impact the structure of the syndicate in terms of number of lenders and number of arrangers. Increased loan size (Loan Size) is expected to be positively related to syndicate structure. Indeed, the motives to diversify loan portfolios and to be in accordance with regulation are more likely to play a role for larger loans and thus implying more lenders within the syndicate.
Maturity of the loan (Maturity) is also considered, although whether it plays a positive or negative role is ambiguous. Greater maturity is associated with greater monitoring costs as long-term loans incur control of collateral and covenant costs. As a consequence, the moral hazard problem involved in syndicated loans is enhanced and therefore implies a smaller syndicate and/or a larger "core" of arrangers. Also, if we consider a positive relationship between maturity and credit risk (Flannery, 1986; Agbanzo et al., 1998) , syndicates should be smaller and/or the number of arrangers should be larger to enhance monitoring efforts and prevent free-riding, as well as to resolve potential borrower distress more efficiently. However, if credit risk and maturity are negatively related , syndicates should be larger and/or the number of arrangers should be smaller.
We also test several characteristics that provide lenders with better protection in case of loan default and thus reduce loan loss. Such characteristics are expected to exert a role on the syndicate structure mainly through their impact on potential agency problems.
Our first idea was to consider the presence of collateral in the loan agreement through a dummy variable equal to one if the loan is secured. However, since information on the presence of collateral is strongly missing, its inclusion in the estimations would have considerably reduced our sample 9 . We instead take the presence of guarantors in the loan agreement into account, with a dummy variable equal to one if at least one guarantor exists (Guarantors). A guarantor gives additional protection for the lenders, as the guarantor will honor a part or the totality of the claim in case of loan default. Therefore, the presence of a guarantor mitigates agency problems resulting from adverse selection in line with the better information owned by the arranger on the borrower. However, empirical literature on the role of collateral in loan contracts provides evidence in favor of the "observed-risk hypothesis" according to which banks would be able to sort borrowers from information they have on their quality (Berger and Udell, 1990; Jimenez and Saurina, 2004) . As a consequence, banks would ask more protection schemes from riskier borrowers. Accordingly, the presence of a guarantor may signal a riskier loan and, consequently, a loan plagued by greater agency problems. Smaller syndicates and/or larger syndicates "core" would promote more effective monitoring, also avoiding duplicative monitoring of the collateral, and more efficient loan restructuring in the event of borrower distress.
Additionally, we include a dummy variable (Sponsors) equal to one if the loan is sponsored. A sponsor is usually an individual capital investor who is involved in the project and might also act as an advisor and eventually as an additional monitor of the 9 Results from estimations with this variable on a reduced sample are very similar to the ones obtained with the alternative proxy for collateralisation. Therefore, we adopt the latter proxy in order to benefit of a larger sample size.
borrower. Therefore, the presence of a sponsor should be positively related to syndicate size and/or negatively to the number of arrangers.
We also take debt seniority into account through a dummy variable (Senior Debt) equal to one if the debt is senior. Although debt seniority constitutes an additional protection for the lenders in the case of loan default, its impact is ambiguous similarly to
Guarantors. If it works as an effective protection for all the lenders, syndicates and number of arrangers should be smaller. But if the seniority does not apply equally to all syndicate members, its influence can be significant for the number of arrangers only.
Similarly, the "observed-risk hypothesis" also suggests a negative impact of this variable on the number of lenders and eventually a positive one on the number of arrangers, as the request for seniority may result from the perception of a higher risk of the borrower.
The presence of covenants, which aim at restricting the discretionary power of the borrower, is taken into account with a dummy variable (Covenants) equal to one if the loan agreement includes covenants. Therefore, the presence of covenants in a loan agreement is expected to reduce the risk of loan default (Rajan and Winton, 1995) , and enhance the ability to monitor the borrower, thereby reducing the monitoring costs. It appears that covenants should favor larger syndicates and/or a smaller number of arrangers as they reduce potential agency problems from moral hazard behavior of member banks during the monitoring process. However, empirical evidence tends to show the opposite: a positive link between the presence of covenants and the probability of default of the borrower (e.g. Foster et al., 1998) . This is in accordance with the "observed-risk hypothesis", where riskier borrowers are offered more binding loan agreements. Therefore, arguments exist for both a positive and negative relationship.
To account for the impact of publicly available information on syndicate structure, we include in our regressions a dummy variable (S&P Rating) equal to one if a Standard and Poor's senior debt rating is available. We expect a positive coefficient since the existence of a rating mitigates the adverse selection problem and therefore allows to form a larger syndicate and/or a reduced syndicate "core" with few arrangers.
Borrower's market presence is proxied through a variable (Borrower Presence)
equal to the occurrence of a particular borrower in the sample 10 . Although this variable is contingent on the available data within the sample, it gives a broad indication of the borrower's presence on the international syndicated lending and therefore his reputation.
We expect a positive coefficient for this variable as a lending to a more present and reputable borrower should involve less informational frictions within the syndicate compared to a new or less present borrower.
We also control for the type (Term Loan, Revolving Bank Facility) and the purpose (General Corporate, Debt Repayment, Project Finance, Working Capital) of the loan through the inclusion of dummy variables 11 . Finally, dummy variables taking benchmark rate (Libor and Euribor), facility issue year, year, region and industry are included in the regressions.
Country-level variables
We now turn to country-level variables that may influence the design of a syndicate. Indeed, Esty and Megginson (2003) have pointed out that institutional factors might influence the syndication process in emerging markets. Therefore, we also test the
We should thus observe a positive coefficient for this variable. However one may also consider that stock markets are an alternative source of financing for large loans requested by companies. Therefore, one might consider that more developed stock markets reduce the potential for syndicated loans in a country, and consequently increase the share of bank loans which are not syndicated. Such influence should be even more prominent for the development of bond markets, measured with the ratio of private domestic debt securities to GDP (Private Bond Markets) and the ratio of public domestic debt securities to GDP (Public Bond Markets). Bonds directly compete syndicated loans for large financing needs of companies, but this negative influence may also be offset by the positive impact of the existence of bond markets, which contribute to increase information for participant banks in loan syndicates and therefore limits the adverse selection problem in syndicated loans. Furthermore, in high legal risk countries, efficient reorganization of a distressed borrower might be difficult. Hence, larger syndicate structure are more adapted as they minimize
hold-up problems in case of reorganization. However, on a more global basis, the agency problems resulting from all lending decisions should also be mitigated which may favor the choice of a standard loan rather than a syndicated loan for the lead bank. Indeed, the motive of the risk-sharing should play a lesser role in well-protected legal environments.
Hence, monitoring should be more important in the presence of high legal risk (few legal rights and low contract enforcement), through a smaller syndicate and/or a larger number of arrangers.
We also control for the number of syndicated loan facilities in a particular country through the inclusion of the Syndicated Loan Issues variable. The latter allows controlling for the development of the syndicated lending market, which should be positively related to the syndicate design.
Syndicated lending in EME, data, and methodology
This section is devoted to the discussion of the evolution of the syndicated lending markets in EME and the presentation of the sample and methodology used in the article. Furthermore, more than 25% of syndicated loans are granted to the financial sector.
Syndicated lending in EME
These loans have short maturities and their costs is more than twice high as that of loans granted to financial institutions in non-assisted countries. Overall, lower growth rates in IMF-assisted countries could be explained by the higher cost of funds in the syndicated loan markets.
Data and methodology
The sample of syndicated loans comes from the Dealscan database, provided by the Loan Pricing Corporation (LPC, Reuters). Data concerning financial structure and regulatory and supervisory characteristics come from Beck et al. (2000) , while data on banking regulation come from Barth et al. (2005) . Indicators of legal environment come from La Porta et al. (1998 which account respectively for 70.6%, 12.7%, 9.7%, and 7% of the total number of loan facilities in our sample. Therefore, Asia represents almost three quarters of the loans in our sample. These shares are in accordance with the relative importance of each geographical area on the syndicated loans markets for emerging countries. We observe that the average syndicate has almost 11 lenders and 3 arrangers 14 .
The average loan size is 206,929 million USD with an average maturity of 4,5 years 15 .
The covenants are only included in one quarter of loan contracts. The presence of guarantors and sponsors is scarcer, being observed in only 8.98% and 9.26% of loan contracts respectively. More than half of the loans are senior debt for the lenders. An 13 We do not have any syndicated loans to borrowers from Africa in our sample. 14 The average size of a bank loan syndicate, measured in terms of number of lenders, is close to 10 in Asia and Latin America, while it increases in Central and Eastern Europe (more than 12) and is the most important in Middle East (more than 18). The number of arrangers is the lowest in Asia (less than 3), average in Latin America and Central and Eastern Europe (close to 4) and large in Middle East (close to 5). 15 For comparison, from 1987 to 1995 in USA, Lee and Mullineux (2004) have an average number of lenders equal to 9, with average loan volume at 221 millions USD and average maturity equal to almost 4 years. On a more recent time span (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) , Sufi (2007) observes average number of lenders and arrangers at 8 and 2 respectively. Average loan is equal to 364 million USD and average maturity is 3 years.
-21 -average borrower had 5 syndicated loan facilities during the time span of the sample. On average, bank markets are relatively concentrated and rather cost efficient. Stock market capitalization is important while the bonds market is rather small. Non performing loans formal definition is quite common, with a minimum capital to assets ratio above 8%.
Creditor rights and rule of law are in the upper-average. 
Number of Arrangers = g(Intercept, Loan characteristics, Banking structure, Financial development, Regulation and supervision, Legal risk)
Results and discussion
We perform six series of Poisson regressions, with varying combinations of tested factors, for the two individual equations (1) and (2) where the endogenous variables are the Number of Lenders and the Number of Arrangers respectively. All regressions include the loan characteristics. However, we test alternatively the role of the four categories of country-level variables. Namely, while the first set of regressions does not include any country-level variable, the four following regressions alternatively add one 16 Poisson regression assumes the data follows a Poisson distribution, which is skewed with non-negative and discrete values and variance increasing with the mean. Given the integer nature of the dependent variable, this estimation technique is the most appropriate. We do not use negative binomial regressions as overdispersion is weak in our sample. Given the skewness of the dependent variables distribution we also do not perform OLS regressions, although, as well as Tobit regressions, OLS regressions give qualitatively similar results.
category of country-level variables to explain the bank's decision to syndicate a loan.
Therefore, the second, third, fourth and fifth sets of estimations respectively consider the role of banking structure, financial development, banking regulation, and legal risk, on the syndicate structure. The last set of estimation includes all of the country level variables as a robustness check, as well as to investigate which country level factors are the most important determinant of syndicate design.
-Insert Table 2 (1) and (2) respectively.
Loan Size (in logarithm) is positive and significant in all regressions, suggesting as expected that larger syndicates, both in terms of total number of lenders and arrangers, form around larger loans in accordance with the motives of the diversification of loan portfolios and regulatory-driven issues (as in Lee and Mullineux, 2004 and Sufi, 2007) .
The coefficient of Maturity is significantly negative in all estimations of equation (1) and significantly positive in most of estimations of equation (2). This finding can be explained by the fact that greater maturity strengthens the moral hazard problem through higher monitoring costs of the loan as well as by a positive relationship between maturity and credit risk (Flannery, 1986; Agbanzo et al., 1998) . This finding contrasts with prior literature on the USA market and advocates for the specificity of syndicate design in emerging markets.
Among the variables taking into account the reduction of the loan loss in case of default, we observe that Senior Debt is almost always negative and significant in all We also observe that borrower transparency, proxied with the existence of a senior debt rating by Standard and Poor's, has no impact on syndicate structure. This finding contrasts with the results obtained by Lee and Mullineux (2004) and Sufi (2007) .
This finding might be driven by the small number of borrowers being rated (less than 7%) or alternatively, by the fact that syndicate lenders, especially the arrangers, perform screening actions within a relationship based framework and external public information does not add supplementary elements to reduce borrower opaqueness. Finally, as expected, borrower presence is positively related to syndicate design 17 .
We now turn to the analysis of the country-level variables. The main finding is the significance of most variables. In other words, institutions matter for the syndicate structure. All kinds of institutions matter in the sense that we observe significant variables for legal risk, financial development, and banking structure and regulation.
Banking structure clearly matters for the syndicate structure in emerging markets. Furthermore, the development of bond markets reduces syndicate size as they are direct competitors to syndicated loans. Public bonds affect the number of arrangers only, which is consistent with the fact that syndicated loans often fund public large public 18 Let also note that the mean level of Overheads is relatively low in our sample (less than 5%), therefore larger syndicates do not necessarily imply more agency costs as the participating banks do not carry a burden of cost-inefficiency that would probably exacerbate the free-riding problems and inefficient monitoring.
-25 - The results with the legal environment variables are presented with the specifications (1.5) and (2.5). We observe that better creditor rights protection has a negative and significant influence on the number of lenders whereas it has a positive and significant impact on the number of arrangers. A better protection of creditors might reduce lenders' incentives to monitor borrowers and consequently exacerbates free-riding problems, which can be tackled through an adapted syndicate structure of small size and a larger "core" of arrangers. Let also note that as the other creditors can benefit from such protection, monitoring of the borrower by the syndicate must increase to avoid inefficient 19 We also test alternative proxies for financial structure and legal risk. For instance, we replace Stock Markets with the ratio of private credit of financial institutions to GDP which can be considered as another proxy of the country's financial structure development. Results from specifications (1.3) and (2.3) are robust to this replacement.
re-contracting in case of distress. Smaller syndicates with larger cores are more suitable for such task. As the quality of institutions increases (i.e. legal risk decreases), the number of arrangers diminishes as monitoring is more effective in such legal environment. This result is in accordance with the findings of Esty and Megginson (2003) 20 .
-Insert Table 3 20 Replacing Rule of Law with alternative proxies from La Porta et al. (1997 Porta et al. ( , 1998 such as Risk of Expropriation and Repudiation of Contracts (defined as indexes, scaled from 0 to 10 with lower scores for higher risks, assessing the risk of "outright confiscation" or "forced nationalization" and of the ''risk of a modification in a contract" respectively) does not affect our results, while these alternative proxies exhibit significant and consistent signs. 21 Due to significant correlations between country-level variables, we drop Stock Markets, Mincar*Credit Risk and Syndicated Loan Issues from the regressions. 22 We also perform all our regressions on a limited sample (less than 2,000 observations) taking borrower's risk characteristics into account through balance sheet ratios from Compustat. Following Sufi (2007), we include the following ratios in our regressions : Total Debt to Total Capital, Quick Ratio, Net Income to Total Assets, and logarithm of Total Assets. The first two variables are borrower's risk proxies and affect
Summary and conclusion
In this paper, we have investigated the determinants of the syndicate design by analyzing the role of loan characteristics following the study design of Lee and Mullineaux (2004) on US syndicated loans. Additionally, we examined institutional factors inspired by recent literature on the role of institutions on a bank's loan behavior (Esty and Megginson, 2003; Qian and Strahan, 2007) .
Our main findings can be summarized as follows. First, we have provided evidence to explain the role of several loan characteristics in the structure of bank syndicates funding loans to borrowers from emerging markets.
Second, we have shown that institutions influence the syndicate structure. Indeed we undoubtedly found that banking structure, financial development, banking regulation, and legal environment exert an impact on the syndicate size. Overall, the structures of syndicates are adapted to enhance monitoring of the borrower and to increase the efficiency of re-contracting process in case of borrower's distress. Main syndication motives, such as loans portfolio diversification, regulatory pressure and management costs reduction, also influence syndicate structure in emerging markets.
Our analysis can be extended in a number of ways. An important input to understand syndication process would be to include borrowers and lenders characteristics into regressions explaining the syndication process (following Altunbas et al., 2006) .
Furthermore, the formation of syndicates, its heterogeneity and dynamics, as well as its dependence upon business cycles, industrial sectors and geographic areas, should be more deeply investigated. Ultimately, empirical knowledge regarding "who syndicates with whom" and the factors influencing this process should be empirically modelled, using more developed econometric techniques. Finally, due to its specific nature of mixed finance, merging relationship based and transaction based lending, a closer look at the advantages in terms of information production (hard versus soft) and the motivations and drawbacks of forming and entering into a syndicate should be performed, both within theoretical and empirical settings. Barth et al. (2005) NPL Definition =1 if a formal definition of non-performing loans exists Barth et al. (2005) Abroad Loan Prohibited =1 if banks are prohibited from granting loans abroad Barth et al. (2005) Creditor rights An index aggregating four aspects of creditor rights. The index ranges from zero (weak creditor rights) to four (strong creditor rights)
La Porta et al. (1998) Rule of Law An index indicating the law enforcement. The index ranges from zero (weak enforcement) to ten (strong enforcement)
La Porta et al. (1998) 
